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ABSTRACT
Large-scale pre-trained language models such as BERT and RoBERTa have
achieved state-of-the-art performance across a wide range of NLP tasks. Recent
studies, however, show that such BERT-based models are vulnerable facing the
threats of textual adversarial attacks. We aim to address this problem from an
information-theoretic perspective, and propose InfoBERT, a novel learning frame-
work for robust fine-tuning of pre-trained language models. InfoBERT contains
two mutual-information-based regularizers for model training: (i) an Information
Bottleneck regularizer, which suppresses noisy mutual information between the
input and the feature representation; and (ii) an Anchored Feature regularizer,
which increases the mutual information between local stable features and global
features. We provide a principled way to theoretically analyze and improve the ro-
bustness of language models in both standard and adversarial training. Extensive
experiments demonstrate that InfoBERT achieves state-of-the-art robust accuracy
over several adversarial datasets on Natural Language Inference (NLI) and Ques-
tion Answering (QA) tasks.
1 INTRODUCTION
Self-supervised representation learning pre-trains good feature extractors from massive unlabeled
data, which show promising transferability to various downstream tasks. Recent success includes
large-scale pre-trained language models (e.g., BERT, RoBERTa, and GPT-3 (Devlin et al., 2019;
Liu et al., 2019; Brown et al., 2020)), which have advanced state of the art over a wide range of
NLP tasks such as NLI and QA, even surpassing human performance. Specifically, in the computer
vision domain, many studies have shown that self-supervised representation learning is essentially
solving the problem of maximizing the mutual information (MI) I(X;T ) between the input X and
the representation T (van den Oord et al., 2018; Belghazi et al., 2018; Hjelm et al., 2019; Chen
et al., 2020). Since MI is computationally intractable in high-dimensional feature space, many MI
estimators (Belghazi et al., 2018) have been proposed to serve as lower bounds (Barber & Agakov,
2003; van den Oord et al., 2018) or upper bounds (Cheng et al., 2020) of MI. Recently, Kong et al.
point out that the MI maximization principle of representation learning can be applied to not only
computer vision but also NLP domain, and propose a unified view that recent pre-trained language
models are maximizing a lower bound of MI among different segments of a word sequence.
On the other hand, deep neural networks are known to be prone to adversarial examples (Goodfel-
low et al., 2015; Papernot et al., 2016; Eykholt et al., 2017; Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), i.e., the
outputs of neural networks can be arbitrarily wrong when human-imperceptible adversarial pertur-
bations are added to the inputs. Textual adversarial attacks typically perform word-level substitution
(Ebrahimi et al., 2018; Alzantot et al., 2018; Ren et al., 2019) or sentence-level paraphrasing (Iyyer
et al., 2018; Zhang et al., 2019) to achieve semantic/utility preservation that seems innocuous to
human, while fools NLP models. Recent studies (Jin et al., 2020; Zang et al., 2020; Nie et al., 2020)
further show that even large-scale pre-trained language models (LM) such as BERT are vulnerable to
adversarial attacks, which raises the challenge of building robust real-world LM applications against
unknown adversarial attacks.
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We investigate the robustness of language models from an information theoretic perspective, and
propose a novel learning framework InfoBERT, which focuses on improving the robustness of lan-
guage representations by fine-tuning both local features (word-level representation) and global fea-
tures (sentence-level representation) for robustness purpose. InfoBERT considers two MI-based reg-
ularizers: (i) the Information Bottleneck regularizer manages to retain only the minimal sufficient
statistics for downstream tasks, while removing excessive and noisy information that may incur ad-
versarial attacks; (ii) the Anchored Feature regularizer carefully selects useful local stable features
that are invulnerable to adversarial attacks, and maximizes the mutual information between local
stable features and global features to improve the robustness of the global representation. In this
paper, we provide a detailed theoretical analysis to explicate the effect of InfoBERT for robustness
improvement, along with extensive empirical adversarial evaluation to validate the theory.
Our contributions are summarized as follows. (i) We propose a novel learning framework InfoBERT
from the information theory perspective, aiming to effectively improve the robustness of language
models. (ii) We provide a principled theoretical analysis on model robustness, and propose two MI-
based regularizers to refine the local and global features, which can be applied to both standard and
adversarial training for different NLP tasks. (iii) Comprehensive experimental results demonstrate
that InfoBERT can substantially improve robust accuracy by a large margin without sacrificing the
benign accuracy, yielding the state-of-the-art performance across multiple adversarial datasets on
NLI and QA tasks.
2 RELATED WORK
Textual Adversarial Attacks/Defenses Most existing textual adversarial attacks focus on word-
level adversarial manipulation. Ebrahimi et al. (2018) is the first to propose a whitebox gradient-
based attack to search for adversarial word/character substitution. Following work (Alzantot et al.,
2018; Ren et al., 2019; Zang et al., 2020; Jin et al., 2020) further constrains the perturbation search
space and adopts Part-of-Speech checking to make NLP adversarial examples look natural to human.
To defend against textual adversarial attacks, existing work can be classified into three categories:
(i) Adversarial Training is a practical method to defend against adversarial examples. Existing work
either uses PGD-based attacks to generate adversarial examples in the embedding space of NLP as
data augmentation (Zhu et al., 2020a), or regularizes the standard objective using virtual adversarial
training (Jiang et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020; Gan et al., 2020). However, one drawback is that
the threat model is often unknown, which renders adversarial training less effective when facing
unseen attacks. (ii) Interval Bound Propagation (IBP) (Dvijotham et al., 2018) is proposed as a new
technique to consider the worst-case perturbation theoretically. Recent work (Huang et al., 2019; Jia
et al., 2019) has applied IBP in the NLP domain to certify the robustness of models. However, IBP-
based methods rely on strong assumptions of model architecture and are difficult to adapt to recent
transformer-based language models. (iii) Randomized Smoothing (Cohen et al., 2019) provides a
tight robustness guarantee in `2 norm by smoothing the classifier with Gaussian noise. Ye et al.
(2020) adapts the idea to the NLP domain, and replace the Gaussian noise with synonym words to
certify the robustness as long as adversarial word substitution falls into predefined synonym sets.
However, to guarantee the completeness of the synonym set is challenging.
Representation Learning MI maximization principle has been adopted by many studies on self-
supervised representation learning (van den Oord et al., 2018; Belghazi et al., 2018; Hjelm et al.,
2019; Chen et al., 2020). Specifically, InfoNCE (van den Oord et al., 2018) is used as the lower
bound of MI, forming the problem as contrastive learning (Saunshi et al., 2019). However, Tian
et al. (2020) suggests that the InfoMax (Linsker, 1988) principle may introduce excessive and noisy
information, which could be adversarial. To generate robust representation, Zhu et al. (2020b) for-
malizes the problem from a mutual-information perspective, which essentially performs adversarial
training for worst-case perturbation, while mainly considers the continuous space in computer vi-
sion. In contrast, InfoBERT originates from an information-theoretic perspective and is compatible
with both standard and adversarial training for discrete input space of language models.
3 INFOBERT
Before diving into details, we first discuss the textual adversarial examples we consider in this paper.
We mainly focus on the dominant word-level attack as the main threat model, since it achieves higher
attack success and is less noticeable to human readers than other attacks. Due to the discrete nature
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of text input space, it is difficult to measure adversarial distortion on token level. Instead, because
most word-level adversarial attacks (Alzantot et al., 2018; Li et al., 2019; Jin et al., 2020) constrain
word perturbations via the bounded magnitude in the semantic embedding space, we therefore define
the adversarial text examples with distortions constrained in the embedding space as follows.
Definition 3.1. (-bounded Textual Adversarial Examples). Given a sentence x = [x1;x2; ...;xn],
where xi is the word at the i-th position, the -bounded adversarial sentence x′ = [x′1;x
′
2; ...;x
′
n] for
a classifier F satisfies: (1) F(x′) 6= o(x′), where o(·) is the oracle (e.g., human decision-maker);
(2) ||ti − t′i||2 ≤  for i = 1, 2, ..., n, where  ≥ 0 and ti is the word embedding of xi.
For simplicity, we denote the -bounded constraint of adversarial example x′ for sentence x as
D(x, x′) ≤ .
3.1 INFORMATION BOTTLENECK AS A REGULARIZER
In this section, we first discuss the general IB implementation, and then explain how IB formulation
is adapted to InfoBERT as a regularizer along with theoretical analysis to support why IB regularizer
can help improve the robustness of language models. The IB principle formulates the goal of deep
learning as an information-theoretic trade-off between representation compression and predictive
power (Tishby & Zaslavsky, 2015). Given the input source X , a deep neural net learns the internal
representation T of some intermediate layer and maximizes the MI between T and label Y , so that
T subject to a constraint on its complexity contains sufficient information to infer the target label Y .
This gives us the Lagrangian formulation of IB:
max LIB = I(Y ;T )− βI(X;T ), (1)
where β > 0 is a hyper-parameter to control the tradeoff, and I(Y ;T ) is defined as:
I(Y ;T ) =
∫
dy dt p(y, t) log
p(y, t)
p(y)p(t)
. (2)
Since Eq. (2) is intractable, we instead use the lower bound from Barber & Agakov (2003):
I(Y ;T ) ≥
∫
dy dt p(y, t) log qψ(y | t), (3)
where qψ(y|t) is the variational approximation learned by a neural network parameterized by ψ for
the true distribution p(y|t). This indicates that maximizing the lower bound of the first term of IB
I(Y ;T ) is equivalent to minimizing the task cross-entropy loss `task = H(Y | T ).
To derive a tractable lower bound of IB, we here use an upper bound (Cheng et al., 2020) of I(X;T )
I(X;T ) ≤
∫
dx dt p(x, t) log(p(t | x))−
∫
dx dt p(x)p(t) log(p(t | x)). (4)
By combining Eq. (3) and (4), we can maximize the tractable lower bound LˆIB of IB in practice by:
LˆIB = 1
N
N∑
i=1
[
log qψ(y
(i) | t(i))]− β
N
N∑
i=1
[
log(p(t(i) | x(i)))− 1
N
N∑
j=1
log(p(t(j) | x(i)))
]
(5)
with data samples {x(i), y(i)}Ni=1, where qψ can represent any classification model (e.g., BERT), and
p(t | x) can be viewed as the feature extractor fθ : X → T , where X and T are the support of the
input source X and extracted feature T , respectively.
The above is a general implementation of IB objective function. In InfoBERT, we consider T as
local features corresponding to the word-level features after the BERT embedding layer fθ. The fol-
lowing BERT self-attentive layers along with the linear classification head serve as qψ(y|t) that pre-
dicts the target Y given representation T . Formally, given random variables X = [X1;X2; ...;Xn]
representing input sentences with Xi (word token at i-th index), let T = [T1; ...;Tn] denote the
random variables representing the local features generated from input X , where Ti ∈ Rd is the
high-dimensional feature for word Xi. Due to the high dimensionality d of each word feature (e.g.,
768 for BERT-base), when the sentence length n increases, the dimensionality of local features T
becomes too large to compute I(X;T ) in practice. Thus, we propose a localized formulation of IB:
max LLIB = I(Y ;T )− nβ
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti). (6)
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Theorem 3.1. The localized formulation of IB LLIB is a lower bound of LIB (Eq. (1)), i.e.,
I(Y ;T )− βI(X;T ) ≥ I(Y ;T )− nβ
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti). (7)
Theorem 3.1 indicates that we can instead maximize the lower bound LLIB of IB LIB when I(X;T )
is difficult to compute. If we regard the first term as a task-related objective, the second term of
Eq. (6) (−nβ∑ni=1 I(Xi;Ti)) can be considered as a regularization term to constrain the complexity
of representation T , thus named as Information Bottleneck regularizer. Next, we give a theoretical
analysis for the adversarial robustness of IB and demonstrate why localized IB objective function
can help improve the robustness to adversarial attacks.
Following Definition 3.1, let T = [T1;T2; ...;Tn] and T ′ = [T ′1;T
′
2; ...;T
′
n] denote the local
features for the benign sentence X and adversarial sentence X ′. The distributions of X and
X ′ are denoted by probability p(x) and q(x) with the support X and X ′, respectively. The
q(x′) =
∑
x∈X ,D(x′,x)≤ p(x). We consider the local feature representation has finite support de-
noted by T considering the finite vocabulary size in NLP.
Theorem 3.2. (Adversarial Robustness Bound) The performance gap on benign and adversarial
data |I(Y ;T )− I(Y ;T ′)| is bounded by
|I(Y ;T )− I(Y ;T ′)| ≤ B0 +B1
n∑
i=1
√
|T |(I(Xi;Ti))1/2 +B2
n∑
i=1
|T |3/4(I(Xi;Ti))1/4
+B3
n∑
i=1
√
|T |(I(X ′i;T ′i ))1/2 +B4
n∑
i=1
|T |3/4(I(X ′i;T ′i ))1/4, (8)
where B0, B1, B2, B3 and B4 are constants depending on the sequence length n,  and p(x).
As explained in Eq. (3), I(Y ;T ) and I(Y ;T ′) can be regarded as the model performance on benign
and adversarial data. Thus, the LHS of the bound represents such a performance gap. The adversarial
robustness bound of Theorem 3.2 indicates that the performance gap becomes closer when I(Xi;Ti)
and I(X ′i;T
′
i ) decrease. Note that our IB regularizer in our objective function Eq. (6) achieves the
same goal of minimizing I(Xi;Ti) while retaining the minimal sufficient statistics for downstream
tasks. Theorem 3.2 also suggests that combining adversarial training with our IB regularizer can
further minimize I(X ′i;T
′
i ), leading to better robustness, which is verified in §4.
3.2 ANCHORED FEATURE REGULARIZER
In addition to the IB regularizer that suppresses noisy information that may incur adversarial at-
tacks, we propose a novel regularizer termed “Anchored Feature Regularizer”, which extracts local
stable features and aligns them with sentence global representations, thus improving the stability
and robustness of language representations.
The goal of the local anchored feature extraction is to find features that carry useful and stable in-
formation for downstream tasks. Instead of directly searching for local anchored features, we start
with searching for nonrobust and unuseful features. To identify local nonrobust features, we perform
adversarial attacks to detect which words are prone to changes under adversarial word substitution.
We consider these vulnerable words as features nonrobust to adversarial threats. Therefore, global
robust sentence representations should rely less on these vulnerable statistical clues. On the other
hand, by examining the adversarial perturbation on each local word feature, we can also identify
words that are less useful for downstream tasks. For example, stopwords and punctuation usually
carry limited information, and tend to have smaller adversarial perturbations than words containing
more effective information. Although these unuseful features are barely changed under adversarial
attacks, they contain insufficient information and should be discarded. After identifying the non-
robust and unuseful features, we treat the remaining local features in the sentences as useful stable
features and align the global feature representation based on them.
During the local anchored feature extraction, we perform “virtual” adversarial attacks that generate
adversarial perturbation in the embedding space, as it abstracts the general idea for existing word-
level adversarial attacks. Formally, given an input sentence x = [x1;x2; ...;xn] with its correspond-
4
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Algorithm 1 - Local Anchored Feature Extraction. This algorithm takes in the word local features
and returns the index of local anchored features.
1: Input: Word local features t, upper and lower threshold ch and cl
2: δ ← 0 // Initialize the perturbation vector δ
3: g(δ) = ∇δ`task(qψ(t+ δ), y) // Perform adversarial attack on the embedding space
4: Sort the magnitude of the gradient of the perturbation vector from
||g(δ)1||2, ||g(δ)2||2, ..., ||g(δ)n||2 into ||g(δ)k1 ||2, ||g(δ)k2 ||2, ..., ||g(δ)kn ||2 in ascending
order, where zi corresponds to its original index.
5: Return: ki, ki+1, ..., kj , where cl ≤ in ≤ jn ≤ ch.
ing local embedding representation t = [t1; ...; tn], where x and t are the realization of random vari-
ables X and T , we generate adversarial perturbation δ in the embedding space so that the task loss
`task increases. The adversarial perturbation δ is initialized to zero, and the gradient of the loss with
respect to δ is calculated by g(δ) = ∇δ`task(qψ(t+δ), y) to update δ ←
∏
||δ||F≤(ηg(δ)/||g(δ)||F ).
The above process is similar to one-step PGD with zero-initialized perturbation δ. Since we only
care about the ranking of perturbation to decide on robust features, in practice we skip the update of
δ to save computational cost, and simply examine the `2 norm of the gradient g(δ)i of the perturba-
tion on each word feature ti. A feasible plan is to choose the words whose perturbation is neither too
large (nonrobust features) nor too small (unuseful features), e.g., the words whose perturbation rank-
ings are among 50% ∼ 80% of all the words. The detailed procedures are provided in Algorithm 1.
After local anchored features are extracted, we propose to align sentence global representations Z
with our local anchored features Ti. Specifically, we use the information theoretic tool to increase the
mutual information I(Ti;Z) between local anchored features Ti and sentence global representations
Z, so that the global representations can share more robust and useful information with the local
anchored features and focus less on the nonrobust and unuseful ones. By incorporating the term
I(Ti;Z) into the previous objective function Eq. (6), our final objective function becomes:
max I(Y ;T )− nβ
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti) + α
M∑
j=1
I(Tkj ;Z), (9)
where Tkj are the local anchored features selected by Algorithm 1. Due to the intractability of
computing MI, we use InfoNCE (van den Oord et al., 2018) as the lower bound of MI to compute
the last term:
I(Ti;Z) := EP
[
gω(ti, z)− EP˜
[
log
∑
t′i
egω(t
′
i,z)
]]
, (10)
where gω(·, ·) is a score function (or critic function) approximated by a neural network, ti are the
positive samples drawn from the joint distribution P of local anchored features and global repre-
sentations, and t′i are the negative samples drawn from the distribution of nonrobust and unuseful
features P˜.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate how effective InfoBERT improves the robustness of language models
over multiple NLP tasks such as NLI and QA. We evaluate InfoBERT against both strong adversarial
datasets and state-of-the-art adversarial attacks.
4.1 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Adversarial Datasets The following adversarial datasets and adversarial attacks are used to eval-
uate the robustness of InfoBERT and baselines. (I) Adversarial NLI (ANLI) (Nie et al., 2020)
is a large-scale NLI benchmark, collected via an iterative, adversarial, human-and-model-in-the-
loop procedure to attack BERT and RoBERTa. ANLI dataset is a strong adversarial dataset which
5
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Training Model Method Dev Test
A1 A2 A3 ANLI A1 A2 A3 ANLI
Standard
Training
RoBERTa Vanilla 47.6 25.4 22.1 31.1 - - - 31.4InfoBERT 47.8 31.2 31.8 36.6 47.3 31.2 31.1 36.2
BERT Vanilla 0.0 28.9 28.8 19.8 - - - 19.9InfoBERT 26.0 30.1 31.2 29.2 26.4 29.7 29.8 28.7
Adversarial
Training
RoBERTa FreeLB 50.4 28.0 28.5 35.2 48.1 30.4 26.3 34.4InfoBERT 48.4 29.3 31.3 36.0 50.0 30.6 29.3 36.2
BERT FreeLB 23.0 29.0 32.2 28.3 22.2 28.5 30.8 27.4InfoBERT 28.3 30.2 33.8 30.9 25.9 28.1 30.3 28.2
Table 1: Robust accuracy on the ANLI dataset. Models are trained on the benign datasets (MNLI +
SNLI) only. ‘A1-A3’ refers to the rounds with increasing difficulty. ‘ANLI’ refers to A1+A2+A3.
can easily reduce the accuracy of BERTLarge to 0%. (II) Adversarial SQuAD (Jia & Liang, 2017)
dataset is an adversarial QA benchmark dataset generated by a set of handcrafted rules and refined
by crowdsourcing. Since adversarial training data is not provided, we fine-tune RoBERTaLarge on
benign SQuAD training data (Rajpurkar et al., 2016) only, and test the models on both benign and
adversarial test sets. (III) TextFooler (Jin et al., 2020) is the state-of-the-art word-level adversarial
attack method to generate adversarial examples. To create an adversarial evaluation dataset, we sam-
pled 1, 000 examples from the test sets of SNLI and MNLI respectively, and run TextFooler against
BERTLarge and RoBERTaLarge to obtain the adversarial text examples.
Baselines Since IBP-based methods (Huang et al., 2019; Jia et al., 2019) cannot be applied to large-
scale language models yet, and the randomized-smoothing-based method (Ye et al., 2020) achieves
limited certified robustness, we compare InfoBERT against three competitive baselines based on
adversarial training: (I) FreeLB (Zhu et al., 2020a) applies adversarial training to language models
during fine-tuning stage to improve generalization. In §4.2, we observe that FreeLB can boost the
robustness of language models by a large margin. (II) SMART (Jiang et al., 2020) uses adversarial
training as smoothness-inducing regularization and Bregman proximal point optimization during
fine-tuning, to improve the generalization and robustness of language models. (III) ALUM (Liu
et al., 2020) performs adversarial training in both pre-training and fine-tuning stages, which achieves
substantial performance gain on a wide range of NLP tasks. Due to the high computational cost of
adversarial training, we compare InfoBERT to ALUM and SMART with the best results reported in
the original papers.
Evaluation Metrics We use robust accuracy or robust F1 score to measure how robust the baseline
models and InfoBERT are when facing adversarial data. Specifically, robust accuracy is calculated
by: Acc = 1|Dadv|
∑
x′∈Dadv 1[arg max qψ(fθ(x
′)) ≡ y], where Dadv is the adversarial dataset, y is
the ground-truth label, and 1(·) is the indicator function. Similarly, robust F1 score is calculated
by: F1 = 1|Dadv|
∑
x′∈Dadv v(arg max qψ(fθ(x
′)), a), where v(·, ·) is the F1 score between the true
answer a and the predicted answer qψ(fθ(x′)) (see Rajpurkar et al. (2016) for details).
Implementation Details To demonstrate InfoBERT is effective for different language models, we
apply InfoBERT to both pretrained RoBERTaLarge and BERTLarge. Since InfoBERT can be applied
to both standard training and adversarial training, we here use FreeLB as the adversarial training
implementation. InfoBERT is fine-tuned for 2 epochs for the QA task, and 3 epochs for the NLI
task. More implementation details such as α, β, ch, cl selection can be found in Appendix A.1.
4.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Evaluation on ANLI As ANLI provides an adversarial training dataset, we evaluate models in two
settings: 1) training models on benign data (MNLI (Williams et al., 2018) + SNLI (Bowman et al.,
2015)) only, which is the case when the adversarial threat model is unknown; 2) training models
on both benign and adversarial training data (SNLI+MNLI+ANLI+FeverNLI), which assumes the
threat model is known in advance.
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Training Model Method Dev Test
A1 A2 A3 ANLI A1 A2 A3 ANLI
Standard
Training
RoBERTa Vanilla 73.8 48.9 44.4 53.7 - - - 49.7InfoBERT 75.1 50.3 47.1 57.1 73.8 49.1 47.9 56.4
BERT Vanilla 57.4 48.3 43.5 49.3 - - - 44.2InfoBERT 59.3 48.9 45.5 50.9 60.0 46.9 44.8 50.2
Adversarial
Training
RoBERTa
FreeLB 75.2 47.4 45.3 55.3 73.3 50.5 46.8 56.2
SMART 74.5 50.9 47.6 57.1 72.4 49.8 50.3 57.1
ALUM 73.3 53.4 48.2 57.7 72.3 52.1 48.4 57.0
InfoBERT 77.1 51.7 47.5 58.2 75.0 50.5 47.7 58.3
BERT
FreeLB 60.3 47.1 46.3 50.9 60.3 46.8 44.8 50.2
ALUM 62.0 48.6 48.1 52.6 61.3 45.9 44.3 50.1
InfoBERT 60.8 48.7 45.9 51.4 63.3 48.7 43.2 51.2
Table 2: Robust accuracy on the ANLI dataset. Models are trained on both adversarial and benign
datasets (ANLI (training) + FeverNLI + MNLI + SNLI).
Results of the first setting are summarized in Table 1. The vanilla RoBERTa and BERT models
perform poorly on the adversarial dataset. In particular, vanilla BERTLarge with standard training
achieves the lowest robust accuracy of 19.8% among all the models. We also evaluate the robust-
ness improvement by performing adversarial training during fine-tuning, and observe that adversar-
ial training for language models can improve not only generalization but also robustness. In contrast,
InfoBERT substantially improves robust accuracy in both standard and adversarial training. The ro-
bust accuracy of InfoBERT through standard training is even higher than the adversarial training
baseline FreeLB for both RoBERTa and BERT, while the training time of InfoBERT is 1/3 ∼ 1/2
less than FreeLB. This is mainly because FreeLB requires multiple steps of PGD attacks to gener-
ate adversarial examples, while InfoBERT essentially needs only 1-step PGD attack for anchored
feature selection.
Results of the second setting are provided in Table 2, which shows InfoBERT can further improve
robust accuracy for both standard and adversarial training. Specifically, when combined with adver-
sarial training, InfoBERT achieves the state-of-the-art robust accuracy of 58.3%, outperforming all
existing baselines. Note that although ALUM achieves higher accuracy for BERT on the dev set, it
tends to overfit on the dev set, therefore performing worse than InfoBERT on the test set.
Evaluation against TextFooler InfoBERT can defend against not only human-crafted adversarial
examples (e.g., ANLI) but also those generated by adversarial attacks (e.g., TextFooler). Results are
summarized in Table 3. We can see that InfoBERT barely affects model performance on the benign
test data, and in the case of adversarial training, InfoBERT even boosts the benign test accuracy. Un-
der the TextFooler attack, the robust accuracy of the vanilla BERT drops to 0.0% on both MNLI and
SNLI datasets, while RoBERTa drops from 90% to around 20%. We observe that both adversarial
training and InfoBERT with standard training can improve robust accuracy by a comparable large
margin, while InfoBERT with adversarial training achieves the best performance among all models,
confirming the hypothesis in Theorem 3.2 that combining adversarial training with IB regularizer
can further minimize I(X ′i;T
′
i ), leading to better robustness than the vanilla one.
Evaluation on Adversarial SQuAD Previous experiments show that InfoBERT can improve model
robustness for NLI tasks. Now we demonstrate that InfoBERT can also be adapted to other NLP
tasks such as QA in Table 4. Similar to our observation on NLI dataset, we find that InfoBERT
barely hurts the performance on the benign test data, and even improves it in some cases. Moreover,
InfoBERT substantially improves model robustness when presented with adversarial QA test sets
(AddSent and AddOneSent). While adversarial training does help improve robustness, InfoBERT
can further boost the robust performance by a larger margin. In particular, InfoBERT through stan-
dard training achieves the state-of-the-art robust F1/EM score as 78.5/72.9 compared to existing
adversarial training baselines, and in the meantime requires only half the training time of adversarial-
training-based methods.
7
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Training Model Method SNLI MNLI adv-SNLI adv-MNLI adv-SNLI adv-MNLI(m/mm) (BERT) (BERT) (RoBERTa) (RoBERTa)
Standard
Training
RoBERTa Vanilla 92.6 90.8/90.6 56.6 68.1/68.6 19.4 24.9/24.9InfoBERT 93.3 90.5/90.4 59.8 69.8/70.6 42.5 50.3/52.1
BERT Vanilla 91.3 86.7/86.4 0.0 0.0/0.0 44.9 57.0/57.5InfoBERT 91.7 86.2/86.0 36.7 43.5/46.6 45.4 57.2/58.6
Adversarial
Training
RoBERTa FreeLB 93.4 90.1/90.3 60.4 70.3/72.1 41.2 49.5/50.6InfoBERT 93.1 90.7/90.4 62.3 73.2/73.1 43.4 56.9/55.5
BERT FreeLB 92.4 86.9/86.5 46.6 60.0/60.7 50.5 64.0/62.9InfoBERT 92.2 87.2/87.2 50.8 61.3/62.7 52.6 65.6/67.3
Table 3: Robust accuracy on the adversarial SNLI and MNLI(-m/mm) datasets generated by
TextFooler based on blackbox BERT/RoBERTa (denoted in brackets of the header). Models are
trained on the benign datasets (MNLI+SNLI) only.
Training Method benign AddSent AddOneSent
Standard
Training
Vanilla 93.5/86.9 72.9/66.6 80.6/74.3
InfoBERT 93.5/87.0 78.5/72.9 84.6/78.3
Adversarial
Training
FreeLB 93.8/87.3 76.3/70.3 82.3/76.2
ALUM - 75.5/69.4 81.4/75.9
InfoBERT 93.7/87.0 78.0/71.8 83.6/77.1
Table 4: Robust F1/EM scores based on RoBERTaLarge on
the adversarial SQuAD datasets (AddSent and AddOne-
Sent). Models are trained on standard SQuAD 1.0 dataset.
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Figure 1: Local anchored features con-
tribute more to MI improvement than
nonrobust/unuseful features, unveiling
closer relation with robustness.
4.3 ANALYSIS OF LOCAL ANCHORED FEATURES
We conduct an ablation study to further validate that our anchored feature regularizer indeed fil-
ters out nonrobust/unuseful information. As shown in Table 1 and 2, adding adversarial data in
the training set can significantly improve model robustness. To find out what helps improve the
robustness from the MI perspective, we first calculate the MI between anchored features and global
features 1M
∑M
j=1 I(Tkj ;Z) on the adversarial test data and benign test data, based on the model
trained without adversarial training data (denoted by I ′R and IR). We then calculate the MI between
nonrobust/unuseful features and global features 1M ′
∑M ′
i=1 I(Tki ;Z) on the adversarial test data and
benign data as well (denoted by I ′N and IN). After adding adversarial examples into the training set
and re-training the model, we find that the MI between the local features and the global features
substantially increases on the adversarial test data, which accounts for the robustness improvement.
We also observe that those local anchored features extracted by our anchored feature regularizer,
as expected, contribute more to the MI improvement. As shown in Figure 1, the MI improvement
of anchored features on adversarial test data ∆I ′R (red bar on the left) is higher than that of nonro-
bust/unuseful ∆I ′N (red bar on the right), thus confirming that local anchored features discovered by
our anchored feature regularizer have a stronger impact on robustness than nonrobust/unuseful ones.
We conduct more ablation studies in Appendix §A.2, including analyzing the difference between
global and local features for IB regularizer, hyper-parameter selection and so on.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel learning framework InfoBERT from an information theoretic
perspective. Supported by theoretical analysis, InfoBERT provides a principled way to improve the
robustness of BERT and RoBERTa on NLI and QA tasks. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate
that InfoBERT achieves new state of the art on adversarial datasets, shedding light on a new effective
approach towards improving the robustness of representation learning for language models.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
Model Details1 BERT is a transformer (Vaswani et al., 2017) based model, which is unsupervised
pretrained on large corpora. We use BERTLarge-uncased as the baseline model, which has 24 lay-
ers, 1024 hidden units, 16 self-attention heads, and 340M parameters. RoBERTaLarge shares the
same architecture as BERT, but modifies key hyperparameters, removes the next-sentence pretrain-
ing objective and trains with much larger mini-batches and learning rates, which results in higher
performance than BERT model on GLUE, RACE and SQuAD.
Standard Training Details For both standard and adversarial training, we fine-tune InfoBERT for
2 epochs on the QA task, and for 3 epochs on the NLI task. The best model is selected based on the
performance on the development set. All fine-tuning experiments are run on Nvidia V100 GPUs.
For NLI task, we set the batch size to 256, learning rate to 2 × 10−5, max sequence length to 128
and warm-up steps to 1000. For QA task, we set the batch size to 32, learning rate to 3× 10−5 and
max sequence length to 384 without warm-up steps.
Adversarial Training Details2 Adversarial training introduces hyper-parameters including ad-
versarial learning rates, number of PGD steps, and adversarial norm. When combing adversarial
training with InfoBERT, we use FreeLB as the adversarial training implementation, and set adver-
sarial learning rate to 10−1 or 4∗10−2, adversarial steps to 3, maximal perturbation norm to 3∗10−1
or 2 ∗ 10−1 and initial random perturbation norm to 10−1 or 0.
Information Bottleneck Regularizer Details For information bottleneck, there are different ways
to model p(t | x):
1. Assume that p(t | x) is unknown. We use a neural net parameterized by qθ(t | x) to learn
the conditional distribution p(t | x). We assume the distribution is a Gaussian distribution. The
neural net qθ will learn the mean and variance of the Gaussian given input x and representation t.
By reparameterization trick, the neural net can be backpropagated to approximate the distribution
given the training samples.
2. p(t | x) is known. Since t is the representation encoded by BERT, we actually already know the
distribution of p. We also denote it as qθ, where θ is the parameter of the BERT encoder fθ. If we
assume the conditional distribution is a Gaussian N (ti, σ) for input xi whose mean is the BERT
representation ti and variance is a fixed constant σ, the Eq.6 becomes
LLIB = 1
N
N∑
i=1
([
log qψ(y
(i) | t(i))]− β n∑
k=1
[
− c(σ)||t′(i)k − t(i)k ||22 +
1
n
N∑
j=1
c(σ)||tj − tk||22
])
,
(11)
where c(σ) is a positive constant related to σ. In practice, the sample t′i from the conditional
distribution Gaussian N (ti, σ) can be ti with some Gaussian noise, an adversarial examples of
ti, or ti itself (assume σ = 0).
We use the second way to model p(t | x) for InfoBERT finally, as it gives higher robustness im-
provement than the first way empirically (shown in the following §A.2). We suspect that the main
reason is because the first way needs to approximate the distribution p(t | x) via another neural net
which could present some difficulty in model training.
Information Bottleneck Regularizer also introduces another parameter β to tune the trad-off between
representation compression I(Xi;Ti) and predictive power I(Y ;T ). We search for the optimal β
via grid search, and set β = 5× 10−2 for RoBERTa, β = 10−3 for BERT on the NLI task. On the
QA task, we set β = 5 × 10−5, which is substantially lower than β on NLI tasks, thus containing
more word-level features. We think it is mainly because the QA task relies more on the word-level
1We use the huggingface implementation https://github.com/huggingface/transformers
for BERT and RoBERTa.
2We follow the FreeLB implementations in https://github.com/zhuchen03/FreeLB.
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Model Datasets Method Adversarial Accuracy Benign Accuracy(ANLI) (MNLI/SNLI)
BERT StandardDatasets
Vanilla 19.8 86.7/91.3
Auxiliary Net 27.1 83.1/90.7
BERT Encoder fθ 27.7 85.9/91.7
Table 5: Robust accuracy on the ANLI dataset. Here we refer “Standard Datasets” as training on
the benign datasets (MNLI + SNLI) only. “Vanilla” refers to the vanilla BERT trained without
Information Bottleneck Regularizer.
representation to predict the exact answer spans. More ablation results can be found in the following
§A.2.
Anchored Feature Regularizer Details Anchored Feature Regularizer uses α to weigh the bal-
ance between predictive power and importance of anchored feature. We set α = 5× 10−3 for both
NLI and QA tasks. Anchored Feature Regularizer also introduces upper and lower threshold cl and
ch for anchored feature extraction. We set ch = 0.9 and cl = 0.5 for the NLI task, and set ch = 0.95
and cl = 0.75 for the QA task. The neural MI estimator used by infoNCE uses two-layer fully
connected layer to estimate the MI with the intermediate layer hidden size set to 300.
We will release our models and code for future research soon.
A.2 ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A.2.1 ABLATION STUDY ON INFORMATION BOTTLENECK REGULARIZER
Modeling p(t | x) As discussed in §A.1, we have two ways to model p(t | x): (i) using an
auxiliary neural network to approximate the distribution; (ii) directly using the BERT encoder fθ
to calculate the p(t | x). Thus we implemented these two methods and compare the robustness
improvement in Table 5. To eliminate other factors such as Anchored Feature Regularizer and
adversarial training, we set α = 0, β = 5 × 10−2 and conduct the following ablation experiments
via standard training on standard datasets. We observe that although both modeling methods can
improve the model robustness, modeling as BERT encoder gives a larger margin than the Auxiliary
Net. Moreover, the second way barely sacrifices the performance on benign data, while the first
way can hurt the benign accuracy a little bit. Therefore, we use the BERT Encoder fθ to model the
p(t | x) in our main paper.
Model Datasets Features Adversarial Accuracy Benign Accuracy(ANLI) (MNLI/SNLI)
RoBERTa
Standard
Datasets
Vanilla 31.1 90.8/92.6
Global Feature 33.8 90.4/93.5
Local Feature 33.9 90.6/93.7
Standard
and
Adversarial
Datasets
Vanilla 53.7 91.0/92.6
Global Feature 55.1 90.8/93.3
Local Feature 56.2 90.5/93.3
Table 6: Robust accuracy on the ANLI dataset. Here we refer “Standard Datasets” as training on
the benign datasets (MNLI + SNLI) only, and “Standard and Adversarial Datasaets” as training on
the both benign and adversarial datasets (ANLI(trianing) + MNLI + SNLI + FeverNLI). “Vanilla”
refers to the vanilla RoBERTa trained without Information Bottleneck Regularizer.
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Figure 2: Benign/robust F1 score on benign/adversarial QA datasets. Models are trained on the
benign SQuAD dataset with different β.
Local Features v.s. Global Features Information Bottlenck Regularizer improves model robust-
ness by reducing I(X;T ). In the main paper, we use T as word-level local features. Here we
consider T as sentence-level global features, and compare the robustness improvement with T as
local features. To eliminate other factors such as Anchored Feature Regularizer and adversarial
training, we set α = 0, β = 5× 10−2 and conduct the following ablation experiments via standard
training.
The experimental results are summarized in Table 6. We can see that while both features can boost
the model robustness, using local features yield higher robust accuracy improvement than global
features, especially when adversarial training dataset is added.
Hyper-parameter Search We perform grid search to find out the optimal β so that the optimal
trade-off between representation compression (“minimality”) and predictive power (“sufficiency”)
is achieved. An example to search for the optimal β on QA dataset is shown in Fingure 2, which
illustrates how β affects the F1 score on benign and adversarial datasets. We can see that from a
very small β, both the robust and benign F1 scores increase, demonstrating InfoBERT can improve
both robustness and generalization to some extent. When we set β = 5 × 10−5 (log(β) = −9.9),
InfoBERT achieves the best benign and adversarial accuracy. When we set a larger β to further
minimize I(Xi;Ti), we observe that the benign F1 score starts to drop, indicating the increasingly
compressed representation could start to hurt its predictive capability.
A.2.2 ABLATION STUDY ON ANCHORED FEATURE REGULARIZER
Visualization of Anchored Words To explore which local anchored features are extracted, we
conduct another ablation study to visualize the local anchored words. We follow the best hyper-
parameters of Anchored Feature Regularizer introduced in §A.1, use the best BERT model trained
on benign datasets (MNLI + SNLI) only and test on the ANLI dev set. We visualize the local
anchored words in Table 7 as follows. In the first example, we find that Anchored Features mainly
focus on the important features such as quantity number “Two”, the verb “playing” and objects
“card”/“poker” to make a robust prediction. In the second example, the matching robust features
between hypothesis and premise, such as “people”, “roller” v.s. “park”, “flipped upside” v.s. “ride”,
are aligned to infer the relationship of hypothesis and premise. These anchored feature examples
confirm that Anchored Feature Regularizer is able to find out useful and stable features to improve
the robustness of global representation.
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Input (bold = local stable words for local anchored features.)
Premise: Two woman, both sitting near a pile of poker chips, are playing cards.
Hypothesis: Two woman playing poker.
Premise: People are flipped upside - down on a bright yellow roller coaster.
Hypothesis: People on on a ride at an amusement park.
Table 7: Local anchored features extracted by Anchored Feature Regularizer.
A.2.3 EXAMPLES OF ADVERSARIAL DATASETS GENERATED BY TEXTFOOLER
We show some adversarial examples generated by TextFooler in Table 8. We can see most adver-
sarial examples are of high quality and look valid to human while attacking the NLP models, thus
confirming our adversarial dastasets created by TextFooler is a strong benchmark dataset to evaluate
model robustness. However, as also noted in Jin et al. (2020), we observe that some adversarial
examples look invalid to human For example, in the last example of Table 8, TextFooler replaces
“stand” with “position”, losing the critical information that “girls are standing instead of kneeling”
and fooling both human and NLP models. Therefore, we expect that InfoBERT should achieve
better robustness when we eliminate such invalid adversarial examples during evaluation.
Input (red = Modified words, bold = original words.)
Valid Adversarial Examples
Premise: A young boy is playing in the sandy water.
Original Hypothesis: There is a boy in the water.
Adversarial Hypothesis: There is a man in the water.
Model Prediction: Entailment→ Contradiction
Premise: A black and brown dog is playing with a brown and white dog .
Original Hypothesis: Two dogs play.
Adversarial Hypothesis: Two dogs play gaming.
Model Prediction: Entailment→ Neutral
Premise: Adults and children share in the looking at something, and some young ladies stand to the side.
Original Hypothesis: Some children are sleeping.
Adversarial Hypothesis: Some children are dreaming.
Model Prediction: Contradiction→ Neutral
Premise: Families with strollers waiting in front of a carousel.
Original Hypothesis: Families have some dogs in front of a carousel.
Adversarial Hypothesis: Families have some doggie in front of a carousel.
Model Prediction: Contradiction→ Entailment
Invalid Adversarial Examples
Premise: Two girls are kneeling on the ground.
Original Hypothesis: Two girls stand around the vending machines.
Adversarial Hypothesis: Two girls position around the vending machinery.
Model Prediction: Contradiction→ Neutral
Table 8: Adversarial Examples Generated by TextFooler for BERTLarge on SNLI dataset.
A.3 PROOFS
A.3.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1
We first state a lemma.
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Lemma A.1. Let X = [X1;X2; ...;Xn] be a sequence of random variables representing the in-
put language tokens, and T = [T1;T2; ...;Tn] be a sequence of random variables representing its
corresponding local features. Then we have
I(X;T ) ≤ n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti) (12)
Proof. Since X = [X1;X2; ...;Xn] and T = [T1;T2; ...;Tn] are language tokens with its corre-
sponding local representations, we have
I(X;T ) = I(X;T1, T2, ..., Tn) =
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi | Y1, Y2, ..., Yi−1)−H(Yi | X,Y1, Y2, ..., Yn)] (13)
≤
n∑
i=1
[H(Yi)−H(Yi | X)] =
n∑
i=1
I(X;Yi) (14)
≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
I(Xj ;Yi) ≤ n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Yi), (15)
where the first inequality follows because conditioning reduces entropy, and the last inequality is
because I(Xi;Ti) ≥ I(Xi;Tj) for i 6= j.
Then we directly plug Lemma A.1 into Theorem 3.1, we have the lower bound of LIB as
I(Y ;T )− βI(X;T ) ≥ I(Y ;T )− nβ
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti). (16)
A.3.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
We first state an easily proven lemma,
Lemma A.2. For any a, b ∈ [0, 1],
|a log(a)− b log(b)| ≤ φ(|a− b|), (17)
where φ(·) : R+ → R+ is defined as
φ(x) =

0 x = 0
x log( 1x ) 0 < x <
1
e
1
e x >
1
e
. (18)
It is easy to verify that φ(x) is a continuous, monotonically increasing, concave and subadditive
function.
Now, we can proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof. We use the fact that
|I(Y ;T )− I(Y ;T ′)| ≤ |H(T | Y )−H(T ′ | Y )|+ |H(T )−H(T ′)| (19)
and bound each of the summands on the right separately.
We can bound the first summand as follows:
|H(T | Y )−H(T ′ | Y )| ≤
∑
y
p(y)|H(T | Y = y)−H(T ′ | Y = y)| (20)
=
∑
y
p(y)|
∑
t
p(t | y) log(1/p(t | y))−
∑
t
q(t | y) log(1/q(t | y))| (21)
≤
∑
y
p(y)
∑
t
|p(t | y) log p(t | y)− q(t | y) log q(t | y)| (22)
≤
∑
y
p(y)
∑
t
φ(|p(t | y)− q(t | y)|) (23)
=
∑
y
p(y)
∑
t
φ(|
∑
x
p(t | x)[p(x | y)− q(x | y)]|), (24)
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where
p(x | y) = p(y | x)p(x)∑
x p(y | x)p(x)
(25)
q(x | y) = p(y | x)q(x)∑
x p(y | x)q(x)
. (26)
Since
∑
x∈X∪X ′ p(x | y)− q(x | y) = 0 for any y ∈ Y , we have that for any scalar a,
|
∑
x
p(t | x)[p(x | y)− q(x | y)])| (27)
= |
∑
x
(p(t | x)− a)(p(x | y)− q(x | y))| (28)
≤
√∑
x
(p(t | x)− a)2
√∑
x
(p(x | y)− q(x | y))2. (29)
Setting a = 1|X−X ′|
∑
x∈X∪X ′ we get
|H(T | Y )−H(T ′ | Y ) ≤
∑
y
p(y)
∑
t
φ
(√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ∪ X ′) · ||p(x | y)− q(x | y)||2
)
,
(30)
where for any real-value vector a = (a1, ..., an), V (a) is defined to be proportional to the variance
of elements of a:
V (a) =
n∑
i=1
(ai − 1
n
n∑
j=1
aj)
2, (31)
p(t | x ∈ X ∪ X ′) stands for the vector in which entries are p(t | x) with different values of
x ∈ X ∪X ′ for a fixed t, and p(x | y) and q(x | y) are the vectors in which entries are p(x | y) and
q(x | y), respectively, with different values of x ∈ X ∪ X ′ for a fixed y.
Since
||p(x | y)− q(x | y)||2 ≤ ||p(x | y)− q(x | y)||1 ≤ 2, (32)
it follows that
|H(Y | Y )−H(T ′ | Y )| ≤
∑
y
p(y)
∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ∪ X ′))) (33)
Moreover, we have√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ∪ X ′) ≤
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X )) + V (p(t | x ∈ X ′)) (34)
≤
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X )) +
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ′)), (35)
where the first inequality is because sample mean is the minimizer of the sum of the squared dis-
tances to each sample and the second inequality is due to the subadditivity of the square root func-
tion. Using the fact that φ(·) is monotonically increasing and subadditive, we get
|H(Y | Y )−H(T ′ | Y )| ≤
∑
y
p(y)
∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X )))
+
∑
y
p(y)
∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ′))) (36)
Now we explicate the process for establishing the bound for
∑
y p(y)
∑
t φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X )))
and the one for
∑
y p(y)
∑
t φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ′))) can be similarly derived.
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By definition of V (·) and using Bayes’ theorem p(t | x) = p(t)p(x|t)p(x) for x ∈ X , we have that√
V (p(t | x ∈ X )) = p(t)
√∑
x∈X
(p(x | t)
p(x)
− 1|X |
∑
x′∈X
p(x′ | t)
p(x′)
)
(37)
Denoting 1 = (1, ..., 1), we have by the triangle inequality that√∑
x∈X
(p(x | t)
p(x)
− 1|X |
∑
x′∈X
p(x′ | t)
p(x′)
)
(38)
≤ ||p(x | t)
p(x)
− 1||2 +
√∑
x∈X
(
1− 1|X |
∑
x′∈X
p(x′ | t)
p(x′)
)
(39)
= ||p(x | t)
p(x)
− 1||2 + 1√|X | |∑
x′∈X
(1− p(x
′ | t)
p(x′)
)| (40)
≤ ||p(x | t)
p(x)
− 1||2 + 1√|X | ||p(x | t)p(x) − 1||1 (41)
≤ (1 + 1√|X | )||p(x | t)p(x) − 1||1 (42)
≤ 2
minx∈X p(x)
||p(x | t)− p(x)||1 (43)
From an inequality linking KL-divergence and the l1 norm, we have that
||p(x | t)− p(x)||1 ≤
√
2 log(2)DKL[p(x | t)||p(x)] (44)
Plugging this into Eq. (43) and using Eq. (37), we have the following bound:√
V (p(t | x ∈ X )) ≤ B
2
p(t)
√
dt, (45)
where B = 4
√
2 log(2)
minx∈X p(x)
and dt = DKL[p(x | t)||p(x)].
We will first proceed the proof under the assumption that Bp(t)
√
dt ≤ 1e for any t. We will later see
that this condition can be discarded. If Bp(t)
√
dt ≤ 1e , then∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ))) (46)
≤
∑
t
Bp(t)
√
dt
(
log(
1
B
) + log(
1
p(t)dt
)
)
(47)
= B log(
1
B
)
∑
t
p(t)
√
dt +B
∑
t
p(t)
√
dt log(
1
p(t)dt
) (48)
≤ B log( 1
B
)||p(t)
√
dt||1 +B||
√
p(t)
√
dt||1, (49)
where the last inequality is due to an easily proven fact that for any x > 0, x log( 1x ) ≤
√
x. We p(t)
and d(t) are vectors comprising p(t) and dt with different values of t, respectively.
Using the following two inequalities:
||p(t)
√
dt||1 ≤
√
|T |||p(t)
√
dt||2 ≤
√
|T |||
√
p(t)dt||2 (50)
and
||
√
p(t)
√
dt||1 ≤
√
|T |||
√
p(t)
√
dt||2 (51)
=
√
T
√
||p(t)
√
dt||1 ≤ |T |3/4
√
||
√
p(t)dt||2 (52)
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we have∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ))) ≤ B log( 1
B
)
√
|T |||
√
p(t)dt||2 +B|T |3/4
√
||
√
p(t)dt||2. (53)
Using the equality
||
√
p(t)dt||2 =
√
E[DKL[p(x|t)||p(x)]] =
√
I(X;T ), (54)
we reach the following bound∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ))) (55)
≤ B log( 1
B
)|T |1/2I(X;T )1/2 +B|T |3/4I(X;T )1/4. (56)
Plug Lemma A.1 into the equation above, we have∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ))) (57)
≤ B log( 1
B
)|T |1/2(n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti))
1/2 +B|T |3/4(n
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti))
1/4 (58)
≤ √nB log( 1
B
)|T |1/2
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti)
1/2 + n1/4B|T |3/4
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti)
1/4 (59)
We now show the bound is trivial if the assumption that Bp(t)
√
dt ≤ 1e does not hold. If the
assumption does not hold, then there exists a t such that Bp(t)
√
dt >
1
e . Since√
I(X;T ) =
√∑
t
p(t)dt ≥
∑
t
p(t)
√
dt ≥ p(t)
√
dt (60)
for any t, we get that
√
I(X;T ) ≥ 1eB . Since |T | ≥ 1 and C ≥ 0, we get that our bound in Eq. (55)
is at least
B log(
1
B
)|T |1/2I(X;T )1/2 +B|T |3/4I(X;T )1/4 (61)
≥
√
|T |( log(1/B)
e
+
B1/2|T |1/4
e1/2
) (62)
Let f(c) = log(1/c)e +
c1/2|T |1/4
e1/2
. It can be verifed that f ′(c) > 0 if c > 0. Since B > 4
√
2 log(2)
by the definition of B, we have f(B) > f(4
√
2 log(2)) > 0.746. Therefore, we have
B log(
1
B
)|T |1/2I(X;T )1/2 +B|T |3/4I(X;T )1/4 (63)
≥ 0.746
√
|T | ≥ log(|T |) (64)
Therefore, if indeed Bp(t)
√
dt >
1
e for some t, then the bound in Eq. (55) is trivially
true, since H(T | Y ) is within [0, log(|T |)]. Similarly, we can establish a bound for∑
t φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ′))) as follows:∑
t
φ
(
2
√
V (p(t | x ∈ X ′))) ≤ √nB′ log( 1
B′
)|T |1/2
n∑
i=1
I(X ′i;T
′
i )
1/2 + n1/4B′|T |3/4
n∑
i=1
I(X ′i;T
′
i )
1/4,
(65)
where B′ = 4
√
2 log(2)
minx∈X′ q(x)
.
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Plugging Eq. (65) and Eq. (57) into Eq. (36), we get
|H(T | Y )−H(T ′ | Y )| ≤√nB log( 1
B
)|T |1/2
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti)
1/2 + n1/4B|T |3/4
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Ti)
1/4+
√
nB′ log(
1
B′
)|T |1/2
n∑
i=1
I(X ′i;T
′
i )
1/2 + n1/4B′|T |3/4
n∑
i=1
I(X ′i;T
′
i )
1/4
(66)
Now we turn to the third summand in Eq. (19), we have to bound |H(T )−H(T ′)|.
Recall the definition of -bounded adversarial example. We denote the set of the benign data repre-
sentation t that are within the -ball of t′ by Q(t′). Then for any t ∈ Q(t′), we have
||t′i − ti|| ≤ , (67)
for i = 1, 2, ..., n. We also denote the number of the -bounded adversarial examples around the
benign representation t by c(t). Then we have the distribution of adversarial representation t′ as
follows:
q(t′) =
∑
t∈Q(t′)
p(t)
c(t)
(68)
|H(T )−H(T ′)| (69)
= |
∑
t
p(t) log p(t)−
∑
t′
q(t′) log q(t′)| (70)
= |
∑
t
p(t) log p(t)−
∑
t′
[
(
∑
t∈Q(t′)
p(t)
c(t)
) log(
∑
t∈Q(t′)
p(t)
c(t)
)
]| (71)
≤ |
∑
t
p(t) log p(t)−
∑
t′
∑
t∈Q(t′)
p(t)
c(t)
log(
p(t)
c(t)
)| (72)
= |
∑
t
p(t) log p(t)−
∑
t
c(t)
p(t)
c(t)
log(
p(t)
c(t)
)| (73)
= |
∑
t
p(t) log c(t)|, (74)
where the inequality is by log sum inequality. If we denote the C = maxt c(t) which is the maxi-
mum number of -bounded textual adversarial examples given a benign representation t of a word
sequence x, we have
|H(T )−H(T ′)| (75)
≤ |
∑
t
p(t) log c(t)| (76)
≤ |
∑
t
p(t) logC| = logC. (77)
Note that given a word sequence x of n with representation t, the number of -bounded textual
adversarial examples c(t) is finite given a finite vocabulary size. Therefore, if each word has at most
k candidate word perturbations, then logC ≤ n log k can be viewed as some constants depending
only on n and .
Now, combining Eq. (19), Eq. (66) and Eq. (77), we prove the bound in Theorem 3.2.
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